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Abstract
An important use of machine learning is to learn what
people value. What posts or photos should a user be
shown? Which jobs or activities would a person find
rewarding? In each case, observations of people’s past
choices can inform our inferences about their likes and
preferences. If we assume that choices are approxi-
mately optimal according to some utility function, we
can treat preference inference as Bayesian inverse plan-
ning. That is, given a prior on utility functions and some
observed choices, we invert an optimal decision-making
process to infer a posterior distribution on utility func-
tions. However, people often deviate from approximate
optimality. They have false beliefs, their planning is
sub-optimal, and their choices may be temporally in-
consistent due to hyperbolic discounting and other bi-
ases. We demonstrate how to incorporate these devia-
tions into algorithms for preference inference by con-
structing generative models of planning for agents who
are subject to false beliefs and time inconsistency. We
explore the inferences these models make about pref-
erences, beliefs, and biases. We present a behavioral
experiment in which human subjects perform prefer-
ence inference given the same observations of choices
as our model. Results show that human subjects (like
our model) explain choices in terms of systematic de-
viations from optimal behavior and suggest that they
take such deviations into account when inferring pref-
erences.
Keywords: Bayesian learning, cognitive biases, preference
inference
Introduction
The problem of learning a person’s preferences from obser-
vations of their choices features prominently in economics
(Hausman 2011), in cognitive science (Baker, Saxe, and
Tenenbaum 2011; Ullman et al. 2009), and in applied ma-
chine learning (Jannach et al. 2010; Ermon et al. 2014). To
name just one example, social networking sites use a per-
son’s past behavior to select what stories, advertisements,
and potential contacts to display to them. A promising ap-
proach to learning preferences from observed choices is to
Copyright c© 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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invert a model of rational choice based on sequential deci-
sion making given a real-valued utility function (Russell and
Norvig 1995). This approach is known as Inverse Reinforce-
ment Learning (Ng and Russell 2000) in an RL setting and
as Bayesian Inverse Planning (Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum
2009) in the setting of probabilistic generative models.
This kind of approach usually assumes that the agent
makes optimal decisions up to “random noise” in action se-
lection (Kim et al. 2014; Zheng, Liu, and Ni 2014). How-
ever, human deviations from optimality are more systematic.
They result from persistent false beliefs, sub-optimal plan-
ning, and from biases such as time inconsistency and fram-
ing effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If such devia-
tions are modeled as unstructured errors, we risk mistaken
preference inferences. For instance, if an agent repeatedly
fails to choose a preferred option due to a systematic bias,
we might conclude that the option is not preferred after all.
Consider someone who smokes every day while wishing to
quit and viewing their actions as regrettable. In this situa-
tion, a model that has good predictive performance might
nonetheless fail to identify what this person values.
In this paper, we explicitly take into account structured
deviations from optimality when inferring preferences. We
construct a model of sequential planning for agents with in-
accurate beliefs and time-inconsistent biases (in the form
of hyperbolic discounting). We then do Bayesian inference
over this model to jointly infer an agent’s preferences, be-
liefs and biases from sequences of actions in a simple
Gridworld-style domain.
To demonstrate that this algorithm supports accurate pref-
erence inferences, we first exhibit a few simple cases where
our model licenses conclusions that differ from standard ap-
proaches, and argue that they are intuitively plausible. We
then test this intuition by asking impartial human subjects to
make preference inferences given the same data as our al-
gorithm. This is based on the assumption that people have
expertise in inferring the preferences of others when the do-
main is simple and familiar from everyday experience. We
find that our algorithm is able to make the same kinds of
inferences as our human judges: variations in choice are ex-
plained as being due to systematic factors such as false be-
liefs and strong temptations, not unexplainable error.
The possibility of false beliefs and cognitive biases means
that observing only a few actions often fails to identify a
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single set of preferences. We show that humans recognize
this ambiguity and provide a range of distinct explanations
for the observed actions. When preferences can’t be identi-
fied uniquely, our model is still able to capture the range of
explanations that humans offer. Moreover, by computing a
Bayesian posterior over possible explanations, we can pre-
dict the plausibility of explanations for human subjects.
Computational Framework
Our goal is to infer an agent’s preferences from observa-
tions of their choices in sequential decision problems. The
key question for this project is: how are our observations of
behavior related to the agent’s preferences? In more techni-
cal terms, what generative model (Tenenbaum et al. 2011)
best describes the agent’s approximate sequential planning
given some utility function? Given such a model and a prior
on utility functions, we could “invert” it (by performing
full Bayesian inference) to compute a posterior on what the
agent values.
The following section describes the class of models we
explore in this paper. We first take an informal look at the
specific deviations from optimality that our agent model in-
cludes. We then define the model formally and show our im-
plementation as a probabilistic program, an approach that
clarifies our assumptions and enables easy exploration of de-
viations from optimal planning.
Deviations from optimality
We consider two kinds of deviations from optimality:
False beliefs and uncertainty Agents can have false or
inaccurate beliefs. We represent beliefs as probability dis-
tributions over states and model belief updates as Bayesian
inference. Planning for such agents has been studied in work
on POMDPs (Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998). In-
ferring the preferences of such agents was studied in re-
cent work (Baker and Tenenbaum 2014; Panella and Gmy-
trasiewicz 2014). Here, we are primarily interested in the in-
teraction of false beliefs with other kinds of sub-optimality.
Temporal inconsistency Agents can be time-inconsistent
(also called “dynamically inconsistent”). Time-inconsistent
agents make plans that they later abandon. This concept has
been used to explain human behaviors such as procrastina-
tion, temptation and pre-commitment (Ainslie 2001), and
has been studied extensively in psychology (Ainslie 2001)
and in economics (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin
2000).
A prominent formal model of human time inconsistency
is the model of hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie 2001). This
model holds that the utility or reward of future outcomes is
discounted relative to present outcomes according to a hy-
perbolic curve. For example, the discount for an outcome
occurring at delay d from the present might be modeled
as a multiplicative factor 11+d . The shape of the hyperbola
means that the agent takes $100 now over $110 tomorrow,
but would prefer to take $110 after 31 days to $100 after
30 days. The inconsistency shows when the 30th day comes
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Figure 1: Agents with hyperbolic discounting exhibit differ-
ent behaviors depending on whether they model their future
discounting behavior in a manner that is (a) Naive (left) or
(b) Sophisticated (right).
around: now, the agent switches to preferring to take the
$100 immediately.
This discounting model does not (on its own) determine
how an agent plans sequentially. We consider two kinds
of time-inconsistent agents. These agents differ in terms of
whether they accurately model their future choices when
they construct plans. First, a Sophisticated agent has a fully
accurate model of its own future decisions. Second, a Naive
agent models its future self as assigning the same (dis-
counted) values to options as its present self. The Naive
agent fails to accurately model its own time inconsistency.1
We illustrate Naive and Sophisticated agents with a deci-
sion problem that we later re-use in our experiments. The
problem is a variant of Gridworld where an agent moves
around the grid to find a place to eat (Figure 1).
In the left pane (Figure 1a), we see the path of an agent,
Alice, who moves along the shortest path to the Vegetarian
Cafe before going left and ending up eating at Donut Store
D2. This behavior is sub-optimal independent of whether her
preference is for the Vegetarian Cafe or the Donut Store, but
can be explained in terms of Naive time-inconsistent plan-
ning. From her starting point, Alice prefers to head for the
Vegetarian Cafe (as it has a higher undiscounted utility than
the Donut Store). She does not predict that when close to
the Donut Store (D2), she will prefer to stop there due to
hyperbolic discounting.
The right pane (Figure 1b) shows what Beth, a Sophisti-
cated agent with similar preferences to Alice, would do in
the same situation. Beth predicts that, if she took Alice’s
route, she would end up at the Donut Store D2. So she in-
stead takes a longer route in order to avoid temptation. If
the longer route wasn’t available, Beth could not get to the
Vegetarian Cafe without passing the Donut Store D2. In this
case, Beth would either go directly to Donut Store D1, which
1The distinction and formal definition of Naive and Sophisti-
cated agents is discussed in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
is slightly closer than D2 to her starting point, or (if utility
for the Vegetarian Cafe is sufficiently high) she would cor-
rectly predict that she will be able to resist the temptation.
Formal model definition
We first define an agent with full knowledge and no time in-
consistency,2 and then generalize to agents that deviate from
optimality.
We will refer to states s ∈ S, actions a ∈ A, a determinis-
tic utility functionU : S×A→ R, a stochastic action choice
function C : S → A, and a stochastic state transition func-
tion T : S × A → S. To refer to the probability that C(s)
returns a, we use C(a; s).
Optimal agent: full knowledge, no discounting Like all
agents we consider, this agent chooses actions in proportion
to exponentiated expected utility (softmax):
C(a; s) ∝ eαEUs[a]
The noise parameter α modulates between random choice
(α = 0) and perfect maximization (α = ∞). Expected util-
ity depends on both current and future utility:
EUs [a] = U(s, a) + E
s′,a′
[EUs′ [a
′]]
with s′ ∼ T (s, a) and a′ ∼ C(s′). Note that expected future
utility recursively depends on C—that is, on what the agent
assumes about how it will make future choices.
Time-inconsistent agent Now the agent’s choice and ex-
pected utility function are parameterized by a delay d, which
together with a constant k controls how much to discount fu-
ture utility:
C(a; s, d) ∝ eαEUs,d[a]
EUs,d [a] =
1
1 + kd
U(s, a) + E
s′,a′
[EUs′,d+1 [a
′]]
with s′ ∼ T (s, a). For the Naive agent, a′ ∼ C(s′, d + 1),
whereas for the Sophisticated agent, a′ ∼ C(s′, 0). When
we compute what the agent actually does in state s, we set
d to 0. As a consequence, only the Sophisticated agent cor-
rectly predicts its future actions.3 An implementation of the
Naive agent as a probabilistic program is shown in Figure 2.
Time-inconsistent agent with uncertainty We now relax
the assumption that the agent knows the true world state.
Instead, we use a distribution p(s) to represent the agent’s
belief about which state holds. Using a likelihood function
p(o|s), the agent can update this belief:
p(s|o) ∝ p(s)p(o|s)
The agent’s choice and expected utility functions are now
parameterized by the distribution p(s) and the current ob-
servation o:
C(a; p(s), o, d) ∝ eαEUp(s),o,d[a]
2This is the kind of agent assumed in the standard setup of an
MDP (Russell and Norvig 1995)
3This foresight allows the Sophisticated agent to avoid tempting
states when possible. If such states are unavoidable, the Sophisti-
cated agent will choose inconsistently.
var agent = function(state, delay){
return Marginal(
function(){
var action = uniformDraw(actions)
var eu = expUtility(state, action, delay)
factor(alpha * eu)
return action
})
}
var expUtility = function(state, action, delay){
if (isFinal(state)){
return 0
} else {
var u = 1/(1 + k*delay) * utility(state, action)
return u + Expectation(function(){
var nextState = transition(state, action)
var nextAction = sample(agent(nextState, delay+1))
return expUtility(nextState, nextAction, delay+1)
})
}
}
Figure 2: We specify agents’ decision-making processes as
probabilistic programs. This makes it easy to encode ar-
bitrary biases and decision-making constraints. When au-
tomated inference procedures invert such programs to in-
fer utilities from choices, these constraints are automati-
cally taken into account. Note the mutual recursion between
agent and expUtility: the agent’s reasoning about fu-
ture expected utility includes a (potentially biased) model of
its own decision-making.
To compute expected utility, we additionally take the expec-
tation over states. Now EUp(s),o,d [a] is defined as:
E
s∼p(s|o)
[
1
1 + kd
U(s, a) + E
s′,o′,a′
[
EUp(s|o),o′,d+1 [a′]
]]
with s′ ∼ T (s, a), o′ ∼ p(o|s′) and a′ ∼ C(p(s|o), o′, d +
1) (for the Naive agent) or a′ ∼ C(p(s|o), o′, 0) (for the
Sophisticated agent).
Inferring preferences We define a space of possible
agents based on the dimensions described above (utility
function U , prior p(s), discount parameter k, noise param-
eter α). We additionally let Y be a variable for the agent’s
type, which fixes whether the agent discounts at all, and if
so, whether the agent is Naive or Sophisticated. So, an agent
is defined by a tuple θ := (p(s), U, Y, k, α), and we per-
form inference over this space given observed actions. The
posterior joint distribution on agents conditioned on action
sequence a0:T is:
P (θ|a0:T ) ∝ P (a0:T |θ)P (θ) (1)
The likelihood function P (a0:T |θ) is given by the multi-
step generalization of the choice function C corresponding
to θ. For the prior P (θ), we use independent uniform pri-
ors on bounded intervals for each of the components. In the
following, “the model” refers to the generative process that
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Figure 3: Given data cor-
responding to Figure 1,
the model infers a joint
posterior distribution
on preferences, beliefs
and other agent prop-
erties (such as discount
strength) that reveals
relations between differ-
ent possible inferences
from the data. The darker
a cell, the higher its
posterior probability.
involves a prior on agents and a likelihood for choices given
an agent.
Agents as probabilistic programs
We implemented the model described above in the prob-
abilistic programming language WebPPL (Goodman and
Stuhlmu¨ller 2014). WebPPL provides automated inference
over functional programs that involve recursion. This means
that we can directly translate the recursions above into pro-
grams that represent an agent and the world simulation used
for expected utility calculations. All of the agents above can
be captured in a succinct functional program that can easily
be extended to capture other kinds of sub-optimal planning.
Figure 2 shows a simplified example (including hyperbolic
discounting but not uncertainty over state).
For the Bayesian inference corresponding to Equation 1
we use a discrete grid approximation for the continuous vari-
ables (i.e. for U , p(s), k and α) and perform exact inference
using enumeration with dynamic programming.
Model inferences
We now demonstrate that the model described above can in-
fer preferences, false beliefs and time inconsistency jointly
from simple action sequences similar to those that occur fre-
quently in daily life. We later validate this intuition in our ex-
periments, where we show that human subjects make infer-
ences about the agent that are similar to those of our model.
Example 1: Inference with full knowledge We have pre-
viously seen how modeling agents as Naive and Sophisti-
cated might predict the action sequences shown in Figures
1a and 1b respectively. We now consider the inference prob-
lem. Given that these sequences are observed, what can be
inferred about the agent? We assume for now that the agent
has accurate beliefs about the restaurants and that the two
Donut Stores D1 and D2 are identical (with D1 closer to the
starting point).4 We model each restaurant as having an im-
mediate utility (received on arriving at the restaurant) and a
delayed utility (received one time-step after). This interacts
with hyperbolic discounting, allowing the model to repre-
sent options that are especially “tempting” when they can be
obtained with a short delay.
For the Naive episode (Figure 1a) our model infers that ei-
ther softmax noise is very high or that the agent is Naive (as
explained for Alice above). If the agent is Naive, the utility
of the Vegetarian Cafe must be higher than the Donut Store
(otherwise, the agent wouldn’t have attempted to go to the
Cafe), but not too much higher (or the agent wouldn’t give
in to temptation, which it in fact does). This relationship is
exhibited in Figure 3 (top left), which shows the model pos-
terior for the utilities of the Donut Store and Vegetarian Cafe
(holding fixed the other agent components Y , k, and α).
Example 2: Inference with uncertainty In realistic set-
tings, people do not have full knowledge of all facts rele-
vant to their choices. Moreover, an algorithm inferring pref-
erences will itself be uncertain about the agent’s uncer-
tainty. What can the model infer if it doesn’t assume that
the agent has full knowledge? Consider the Sophisticated
episode (Figure 1b). Suppose that the Noodle Shop is closed,
and that the agent may or may not know about this. This cre-
ates another possible inference, in addition to Sophisticated
avoidance of temptation and high noise: The agent might
prefer the Noodle Shop and might not know that it is closed.
This class of inferences is shown in Figure 3 (bottom): When
the agent has a strong prior belief that the shop is open, the
observations are most plausible if the agent also assigns high
utility to the Noodle Shop (since only then will the agent at-
tempt to go there). If the agent does not believe that the shop
is open, the Noodle Shop’s utility does not matter—the ob-
servations have the same plausibility either way.
In addition, the model can make inferences about the
agent’s discounting behavior (Figure 3 right): When utility
for the Vegetarian Cafe is low, the model can’t explain the
data well regardless of discount rate k (since, in this case,
the agent would just go to the Donut Store directly). The
data is best explained when utility for the Vegetarian Cafe
and discount rate are in balance—since, if the utility is very
high relative to k, the agent could have gone directly to the
Vegetarian Cafe, without danger of giving in to the Donut
Store’s temptation.
Example 3: Inference from multiple episodes Hyper-
bolic discounting leads to choices that differ systematically
from those of a rational agent with identical preferences. A
time-inconsistent agent might choose one restaurant more
often than another, even if the latter restaurant provides more
4In Experiment 2, we allow the utilities for D1 and D2 to be
different. See row 3 of Figure 6 and the “Preference” entry for So-
phisticated in Figure 7.
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Figure 4: The observations in Experiment 3 show the Donut Chain Store being chosen twice and the Vegetarian Cafe once.
utility in total. Our model is able to perform this kind of in-
ference. Figure 4 shows the same agent choosing in three
different episodes. While the agent chooses the Donut Store
two out of three times, our model assigns posterior probabil-
ity 0.59 (+/- 0.05 for 95% CI) that the agent prefers the Veg-
etarian Cafe over the Donut Store. As we decrease the prior
probability of high softmax noise, this posterior increases
beyond 0.59. By contrast, a model without time inconsis-
tency infers a preference for the Donut Store, and has to ex-
plain Episode 2 in Figure 4 in terms of noise, which leads to
high-entropy predictions of future choices.
Experiments with Human Subjects
We have shown that, given short action sequences, our
model can infer whether (and how) an agent is time-
inconsistent while jointly inferring appropriate utilities. We
claim that this kind of inference is familiar from every-
day life and hence intuitively plausible. This section pro-
vides support for this claim by collecting data on the infer-
ences of human subjects. In our first two experiments, we
ask subjects to explain the behavior in Figures 1a and 1b.
This probes not just their inferences about preferences, but
also their inferences about biases and false beliefs that might
have influenced the agent’s choice.
Experiment 1: Inference with full knowledge
Experiment 1 corresponds to Example 1 in the previous sec-
tion (where the agent is assumed to have full knowledge).
Two groups of subjects were shown Figures 1a and 1b, hav-
ing already seen two prior episodes showing evidence of a
preference for the Vegetarian Cafe over the other restaurants.
People were then asked to judge the plausibility of different
explanations of the agent’s behavior in each episode.5
Results are shown in Figure 5. In both Naive (Figure 1a)
and Sophisticated (1b) conditions, subjects gave the high-
est ratings to explanations involving giving in to temptation
(Naive) or avoiding temptation (Sophisticated). Alternative
explanations suggested that the agent wanted variety (hav-
ing taking efficient routes to the Vegetarian Cafe in previous
episodes) or that they acted purely based on a preference (for
a long walk or for the Donut Store).
5In a pilot study, we showed subjects the same stimuli and had
them write free-form explanations. In Experiment 1, subjects had
to judge four of the explanations that occurred most frequently in
this pilot.
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Figure 5: Explanations in Experiment 1 for the agent’s be-
havior in Figure 1a (Naive) and 1b (Sophisticated). Subjects
(n=120) knew that the agent has accurate knowledge, and
saw prior episodes providing evidence of a preference for
the Vegetarian Cafe. Subjects selected scores in {1, 2, 3}.
Experiment 2: Inference with uncertainty
Experiment 2 corresponds to Example 2 above. Subjects see
one of the two episodes in Figure 1 (with Figure 1a modified
so D1 and D2 can differ in utility and Figure 1b modified so
the Noodle Shop is closed). There is no prior information
about the agent’s preferences, and the agent is not known to
have accurate beliefs. We asked subjects to write explana-
tions for the agent’s behavior in the two episodes and coded
these explanations into four categories. Figure 6 specifies
which formal agent properties correspond to which category.
While not all explanations correspond to something the
model can infer about the agent, the most common explana-
tions map cleanly onto the agent properties θ—few explana-
tions provided by people fall into the “Other” category (Fig-
ure 7). The model inferences in this figure show the marginal
likelihood of the observed actions given the corresponding
property of θ, normalized across the four property types. In
both the Naive and the Sophisticated case, the model and
people agree on what the three highest-scoring properties
are. Explanations involving false beliefs and preferences rate
more highly than those involving time inconsistency. This is
because, even if we specify whether the agent is Naive/So-
phisticated, the actions in Figure 1a/b are fairly unlikely—
Property Formalization Example explanation from our human subjects
Agent doesn’t know
Donut Store D1 is open.
p(D1 = open) < 0.15 “He decided he wanted to go to the Donut Store for lunch. He
did not know there was a closer location”
Agent falsely believes
Noodle Shop is open.
p(N = open) > 0.85 “He was heading towards the noodle shop first, but when he got
there, it was closed, so he continued on the path and ended up
settling for ... vegetarian cafe.”
Agent prefers D2 to D1. U(D2) > U(D1) “He might also enjoy the second donut shop more than the first”
Agent is Naive / Sophisti-
cated.
Y = Naive/Soph. “He ... headed for the Vegetarian Cafe, but he had to pass by
the Donut shop on his way. The temptation was too much to
fight, so he ended up going into the Donut Shop.”
Figure 6: Map from properties invoked in human explanations to formalizations in the model. The left column describes the
property. The center column shows how we formalized it in terms of the variables used to define an agent θ. The right column
gives an explanation (from our dataset of human subjects) that invokes this property.
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Figure 7: Explanations in Experiment 2 for the agent’s be-
havior in Figures 1a (Naive) and 1b (Sophisticated). Subjects
did not know whether the agent has accurate knowledge, and
did not see prior episodes. There were n=31 subjects (Naive)
and n=40 subjects (Sophisticated).
they require a narrow range of utility values, as illustrated in
Figure 3 (top left), which favors more specific explanations.
Experiment 3: Inference from multiple episodes
Following Example 3 above, subjects (n=50) saw the
episodes in Figure 4 and inferred whether the agent prefers
the Vegetarian Cafe or the Donut Store. Like the model, the
majority of subjects inferred that the agent prefers the Vege-
tarian Cafe. Overall, 54% (+/- 7 for 95% CI) inferred a pref-
erence of Vegetarian Cafe over the Donut Store, compared
to the 59% posterior probability assigned by the model.
Episode 2 (in which the agent does not choose the Donut
Store) is identical to the Sophisticated episode from Figure
1. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that subjects explain this
episode in terms of Sophisticated time-inconsistent plan-
ning. Together with Experiment 3, this suggests that sub-
jects use this inference about the agent’s planning to infer
the agent’s undiscounted preferences, despite having seen
the agent choose the Donut Store more frequently.
Conclusion
AI systems have the potential to improve our lives by help-
ing us make choices that involve integrating vast amounts
of information or that require us to make long and elaborate
plans. For instance, such systems can recommend and filter
the information we see on social networks or music services
and can construct intricate plans for travel or logistics. For
these systems to live up to their promise, we must be willing
to delegate some of our choices to them—that is, we need
such systems to reliably act in accordance with our prefer-
ences and values. It can be difficult to formally specify our
preferences in complex domains; instead, it is desirable to
have systems learn our preferences, just as learning in other
domains is frequently preferable to manual specification.
This learning requires us to build in assumptions about
how our preferences relate to the observations the AI system
receives. As a starting point, we can assume that our choices
result from optimal rational planning given a latent utility
function. However, as our experiments with human subjects
show, this assumption doesn’t match people’s intuitions on
the relation between preferences and behavior, and we find
little support for the simplistic model where what is chosen
most is inferred to be the most valued. We exhibited more re-
alistic models of human decision-making, which in turn sup-
ported more accurate preference inferences. By approaching
preference inference as probabilistic induction over a space
of such models, we can maintain uncertainty about prefer-
ences and other agent properties when the observed actions
are ambiguous.
This paper has only taken a first step in the direction we
advocate. Two priorities for further work are applications to
more realistic domains and the development of alternatives
to using human preference inferences as a standard by which
to evaluate algorithms. The goal for this emerging subfield
of AI is to make systems better able to support humans even
in domains where human values are complex and nuanced,
and where human choices may be far from optimal.
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